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Introduction 
It is difficult to over-estimate the importance of setting 
prices appropriately for a major utility like water, given that 
inappropriate pricing can cause unnecessary damage to 
the comparative competitiveness of a country’s economy. 
In an earlier article in the Commentary, (Cuthbert and 
Cuthbert, 2007), we gave a critique of the current cost 
regulatory capital value (CCRCV) method of utility pricing: 
a method used, for example, in setting revenue limits, and 
so prices, in the water industry in Scotland and in England. 
While that article identified significant problems with the 
CCRCV approach, we did not make detailed 
recommendations about how these problems might be 
rectified. This paper makes a specific proposal about how 
CCRCV should be modified: our proposal is particularly 
well suited to the circumstances where, as in the case of 
Scottish Water, CCRCV pricing is being applied in a 
publicly owned utility. We argue that implementation of the 
proposed approach would have a number of advantages: 
in particular, it would lead to significantly lower water 
charges, while being fully sustainable well within current 
levels of public expenditure provision; it would reduce the 
likelihood of eventual privatisation of the water industry in 
Scotland; and there is the technical advantage of greatly 
reducing the cost to the Scottish Budget of the capital 
charge levied by the Treasury on the assets of the water 
industry in Scotland.  
 
1.  Background 
1.1  Full details on the history and background of the 
CCRCV approach to utility pricing can be found in Cuthbert 
and Cuthbert, 2007. But to recapitulate briefly, the 
Regulatory Capital Value of a utility is an estimate of the 
total value of the capital value of the assets employed by 
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the utility in performing its functions. We draw a basic 
distinction between applications which value the assets of 
the utility at historic prices, and those which value the 
assets in some form of current prices. We denote the latter 
approach as an application of current cost regulatory 
capital value, (CCRCV).  
 
1.2   In a typical application of the CCRCV approach to 
utility price setting by a regulator, the CCRCV is rolled on 
from year to year by: 
 
a.   uprating for inflation 
b.   adding in the value of gross investment 
c.   deducting depreciation, as assessed in current cost 
terms.  
 
The regulator then sets revenue caps for the industry, (that 
is, maximum allowable revenues, which therefore 
determine maximum allowable prices), as the sum of:  
 
i.   the level of current operating expenses the regulator is 
prepared to allow, (after adjusting, for example, for 
whatever level of efficiency savings the regulator judges is 
achievable); 
 
ii.  current cost depreciation; 
 
iii. a capital charge, calculated as the product of an 
assumed rate of return times the estimated CCRCV. 
 
1.3   A version of CCRCV utility pricing was initiated in the 
mid 1990s in England and Wales by the water regulator 
OFWAT, (see OFWAT 2004), to set the revenue caps for 
the water and sewerage companies, which had been 
privatised in 1989. The approach has subsequently been 
extended in the UK to the regulation of, for example, the 
electricity distribution network, airports, and the publicly 
owned water industry in Scotland, and is also proposed for 
the water industry in Northern Ireland. 
 
1.4  There is, however, a major problem with the CCRCV 
approach. This can be seen by considering the simplest 
possible case, where the provision of capital assets is 
funded by borrowing. What the utility operator actually has 
to pay out to the market, to fully fund the provision of 
capital, is equal to depreciation and interest calculated at 
historic cost. But current cost depreciation and interest are 
normally greater than historic cost depreciation and 
interest, particularly where, as in the water industry, 
average asset lives are long: the CCRCV method thus 
leaves the operator with a financial surplus.  
 
The implications of this were examined in detail in Cuthbert 
and Cuthbert, (2007). That paper set out the underlying 
algebra, and showed that, under CCRCV pricing, the utility 
operator will typically benefit from a windfall profit on any 
capital invested: this profit is a function of the rate of 
interest, the rate of inflation, and the length of asset life.  
The profit will commonly be very significant. For example, 
for an interest rate of 5%, with inflation running at 2.5%, 
and an asset with a thirty-year life, the operator will receive 
a windfall profit of over 40% of the value of the capital 
asset. 
 
The probable consequences include: 
 
 overcharging, and excess profits 
 for a privatised utility, excess dividend payments; 
 for a non-privatised utility, funding an undue 
proportion of capital from revenue; 
 likely distortion of the capital investment 
programme, as capital investment itself becomes 
a profitable activity for the utility; 
 unnecessary uncompetitiveness of water’s 
business customers as they are over-charged for 
an important input. 
 
For a public sector utility, the likelihood is that substantial 
cash surpluses would build up in due course: this is likely 
to make the utility a tempting target for eventual 
privatisation. 
 
 
2.   The proposed approach: treating capital 
financed from revenue as a notional loan 
2.1   Is it possible to retain the key features of the CCRCV 
approach, (for example, the way that it smoothes the 
impact on present day charges of the accident of the timing 
of past investment decisions), while at the same time 
correcting the above problems? We argue that the 
modification proposed in this section achieves precisely 
this. The proposal put forward here is particularly relevant 
to the CCRCV method as applied in a publicly owned 
utility, where the financial surplus arising from the 
application of unmodified CCRCV pricing is likely to be 
used, in the first instance, to fund net new capital formation 
out of revenue. 
 
2.2  In Cuthbert and Cuthbert 2007, we suggested that one 
route towards a more acceptable form of CCRCV would 
involve working out a proper decomposition of the current 
cost value of the capital assets of the utility into the 
components arising from different funding sources, that is, 
from borrowing, equity where appropriate, revenue raised 
from customers, inflation, etc. Once this was done, we 
argued that it should then be possible to find a more 
rational basis for determining how these different funding 
sources should be appropriately rewarded. What we are 
going to propose in this paper is in line with the spirit of this 
suggestion.  
 
2.3  What is proposed is that the basis of CCRCV should 
be retained: but that where the CCRCV surplus, (the 
difference between what is charged to customers under 
CCRCV pricing and what is needed to cover historic cost 
depreciation and interest), is used to fund the creation of 
net new capital assets, then this should be regarded as 
customer-provided capital. More specifically, it is proposed 
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that this customer-provided capital should be regarded as a 
notional loan from the consumer base to the company: a 
rebate would then be paid to the customer base, equal in 
amount to the value of historic cost depreciation and 
interest charges on the customers’ loan. 
 
(For the avoidance of doubt, we should make it clear that 
we do not propose that the calculation of notional debt 
would be carried out at the level of the individual customer. 
There would be an overall notional debt, owed to the 
customer base as a whole, on which an aggregate rebate 
would be calculated. This aggregate rebate would then 
need to be allocated to individual customers. This could be 
done in a variety of ways: e.g., as a flat percentage 
reduction in charges. This paper is not concerned with the 
precise detail of this last stage.) 
 
2.4  The following quotation, taken from a reference book 
on utility regulation issued under the auspices of the World 
Bank, is relevant to this proposal: 
 
 “The regulator may consider customer-provided 
capital to be an interest free loan to the operator, 
in which case the operator receives no return on 
that portion of its regulated assets, or the 
regulator may impute to the operator an interest 
payment on the customer provided capital, the 
effect of which is to lower the operator’s 
regulated prices.” (M.A. Jamison et al., 2004) 
 
The underline in the above quotation is ours.  It is clear that 
our proposed approach is entirely consistent with the 
principle embodied in this quotation. 
 
3.  Limiting behaviour in the steady state 
3.1  We illustrate the implications of our proposal by 
considering what happens in a steady state model, where 
real investment is running at a constant amount each year. 
This is a not unreasonable description of, for example, a 
utility like Scottish Water: witness the following quotation 
from the then Water Industry Commissioner, giving 
evidence to the Scottish Parliament Finance Committee in 
December 2003: 
 
“… Scottish Water needs to make on-going 
investment in the industry at the present levels 
for the foreseeable future. There is no prospect 
of a diminishment in the investment spend of 
£400 million to £500 million a year. Every year 
for as long as I will be on the planet, Scottish 
Water will have to spend a similar sum of 
money…” 
3.2  Specifically, we assume that gross investment is 
running at a constant real amount of 1 unit per annum. It is 
assumed that inflation is constant at r% per annum. The 
nominal interest rate is assumed to be i%, (which we 
assume is both the rate at which the utility can borrow from 
the National Loan Fund, and the rate used to assess the 
cost of capital in current cost pricing.) Each year, 
customers are charged an amount to cover the cost of the 
capital goods employed in the industry, where this amount 
is assessed using CCRCV charging. We assume that any 
surplus of customer charges over what is required to pay 
historic cost interest and depreciation is used to fund net 
new investment, and is regarded as a notional loan from 
the customer base. The customer base will in due course 
get a rebate, equal to historic cost interest and depreciation 
on this notional loan. Investment not funded from revenue 
is funded by borrowing from the NLF.  
 
3.3  In the long run, the real, (as opposed to nominal), 
unrebated current cost charge to customers implied by the 
CCRCV approach will settle down to a limiting value, which 
we denote by cc: and the real historic cost interest and 
depreciation on the total annual investment of 1 will settle 
down to a constant amount, denoted by hc. (Note that hc is 
the historic cost interest and depreciation on the gross 
investment of 1: it is not affected by whether gross 
investment is funded in whole or part by borrowing from the 
NLF or the customer). 
 
The limiting behaviour of the rebated payment system is 
entirely determined by cc and hc, as the following 
argument shows: 
 
Each year, the utility has to fund gross real investment 
of 1. The amount of free customer revenue which is 
available to fund this investment is what is left out of cc 
after paying hc historic cost interest and depreciation, 
(either to the NLF, or as a customer rebate): so the 
amount of gross investment funded from customer 
charges would be  
(cc – hc),      if cc – hc   1:  
and 1,        if cc – hc  > 1. 
  
Hence, if   is defined as min(cc – hc, 1), then the 
limiting proportion of gross investment funded out of 
customer charges will be  . 
 
Clearly,   is therefore also the limiting proportion of 
outstanding debt, (actual and notional), funded from 
customer charges: so    also represents the limiting 
proportion of historic cost charges which will go back to 
the customer as a rebate. 
 
Therefore, in the limit, the real amount which customers 
pay after rebate is  (cc -  hc). 
 
3.4  This expression, (cc -  hc), in fact tells us a great 
deal about the limiting behaviour of the rebated system. As 
we will see, the way the system behaves depends critically 
on whether real interest rates are positive or negative, 
(which corresponds to whether  hc > 1 or hc < 1): and on 
whether or not all capital expenditure is eventually funded 
direct from revenue, ( which corresponds to whether   < 1 
or   =1). 
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The following table shows how the amount customers pay 
after rebate, (denoted PAYS), depends on the different 
possible combinations of real interest rate and  . The 
derivation of the relationships in the table is given in Annex 
1. 
 
Table 1:   The rebated charge:  PAYS 
 
 0 <    < 1   = 1 
Real interest rate 
positive 
1 < PAYS < hc PAYS  1 
Real interest rate 
zero 
PAYS = 1 PAYS  1 
Real interest rate 
negative 
hc < PAYS < 1 PAYS  1 
 
3.5   This table is interesting because it gives a fairly 
complete account of the possible relationships under the 
rebate model: but of course, not all the possibilities 
considered in the table are equally likely.  If we regard as 
normality a situation where real interest rates are positive, 
(which is equivalent to the situation hc > 1), and if at the 
same time inflation is relatively low, then we would expect 
to be in the top left hand corner of the table. In this case, 
the rebated charge which customers will pay will actually 
be less than what customers would have paid if the utility 
had been operating historic cost pricing. If inflation rises, 
however, (with interest rates increasing so that real interest 
rates still remain positive), then we would find ourselves in 
the top right hand cell, with all of capital being funded from 
customer charges. In these circumstances, we could find 
ourselves back in the situation where a financial surplus is 
building up in the utility: however, the rate at which this 
surplus would accumulate would be much slower than 
under unmodified CCRCV pricing. 
 
3.6   But how does this model translate into some potential 
real-life scenarios? First, we need to bring in one further 
parameter, which is the length of life of the capital assets. 
We assume that capital assets have a fixed life of n years. 
So, to summarise, we assume that we are operating a 
rebated model where we have fixed gross investment of 1 
unit in real terms per annum: that inflation is r %: the 
nominal interest rate is i %: and that capital assets last for 
n years. The following tables show the limiting real values 
which will result for a number of different combinations of n, 
i, and r. In each case, we show: 
 
 the CCRCV charge: that is, what customers would 
have been charged if full CCRCV pricing were in 
operation; 
 the Historic Cost charge:  that is, what customers 
would have been charged if historic cost pricing 
were in operation; 
 the Rebated Charge: that is, the net amount 
customers would have been charged, after rebate, 
if the rebate system were in operation; 
 the percentage of capital financed from customer 
revenues, if the rebate system were in operation; 
 annual borrowing from the National Loan Fund. 
 
The specific formulae used in deriving these figures are 
given in Annex 2. 
 
3.7   The first point to note about Table 2 is that in all the 
cases considered, the rebated charge is a good deal less 
than the unrebated CCRCV charge: for example, in the 
case where asset life is 30 years, nominal interest rate 5%, 
and inflation 3%, the rebated charge is 62% of what the 
CCRCV charge would have been. Note too that the extent 
of the saving increases with asset life. 
 
In most of the cases considered, the rebated charge is also 
less than the historic cost charge. The exceptions occur 
when there is a conjunction of long asset life with relatively 
high inflation: (for example, asset life 50 years, interest rate 
8%, and inflation 5%, 6% or 7%). Under these, possibly 
relatively unlikely, scenarios, the rebate model would imply 
that substantial financial surpluses would still accrue within 
the utility, (though the extent of these surpluses would be 
much less than implied by unrebated CCRCV charging.)  
 
In most of the cases considered, the rebated charge is in 
fact not much higher than 1, (which is what would be 
implied by funding all capital expenditure direct from 
revenue): typically, the rebated charge lies in the range 
1.02 to 1.23. The exceptions occur with the conjunction of 
long asset life with high inflation, in which case the rebated 
charge is a good deal higher. 
  
In most of the cases considered, the percentage of capital 
financed from revenue is substantial: (for example, for 
asset life 30 years, interest rate 5%, and inflation 3%, 54% 
of gross capital expenditure is financed from revenue).  
This percentage increases with asset life, and the rate of 
inflation. 
 
The bottom row in each table gives the net amount of 
borrowing which would be required from the NLF. For 
example, for asset life 30 years, interest rate 5%, and 
inflation 3%, borrowing from the NLF each year would be 
0.158, (as compared to a gross annual investment 
programme of 1.) To put this in context: if Scottish Water’s 
investment programme is assumed to be around £600 
million per annum in real terms, then this would imply an 
annual borrowing requirement of less than £100 million: 
this compares with a current public expenditure provision of 
around £180 million per annum for Scottish Water. (In most 
of the other cases illustrated in the above table, the 
borrowing requirement would be significantly less than for 
this particular example.) 
 
3.8  As noted in the previous paragraph, the rebated 
charge in the steady state will very often be close to 1: that 
is, it will be close to what consumers would have paid if all 
capital investment had been funded direct from revenue  



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Table 2:  Limiting values for customer rebate model (gross investment = 1 unit per annum 
 
Asset life in years              30 
                                                 Interest rate  5% 
Inflation rate 2% 3% 4% 
CCRCV charge 1.78 1.78 1.78 
Historic cost charge 1.38 1.23 1.11 
Rebated charge 1.23 1.11 1.04 
% of capital financed from rev 39.5% 54.4% 66.9% 
Borrowing from NLF 0.153 0.158 0.14 
    
 
Asset life in years              30 
                                                 Interest rate  8% 
Inflation rate 5% 6% 7% 
CCRCV charge 2.24 2.24 2.24 
Historic cost charge 1.29 1.18 1.08 
Rebated charge 1.02 1.06 1.16 
% of capital financed from rev 94.7% 100% 100% 
Borrowing from NLF 0.026 0 0 
 
Asset life in years              10 
                         Interest rate  5% 
Inflation rate 2% 3% 4% 
CCRCV charge 1.28 1.28 1.28 
Historic cost charge 1.15 1.1 1.05 
Rebated charge 1.13 1.08 1.04 
% of capital financed from rev 12.2% 17.7% 22.8% 
Borrowing from NLF 0.089 0.121 0.146 
 
Asset life in years              10 
                        Interest rate  8% 
Inflation rate 5% 6% 7% 
CCRCV charge 1.44 1.44 1.44 
Historic cost charge 1.14 1.09 1.04 
Rebated charge 1.1 1.06 1.03 
% of capital financed from rev 30.3% 35.2% 39.7% 
Borrowing from NLF 0.159 0.171 0.179 
    
 
Asset life in years              50 
                         Interest rate  5% 
Inflation rate 2% 3% 5% 
CCRCV charge 2.28 2.28 2.28 
Historic cost charge 1.56 1.32 1.14 
Rebated charge 1.16 1.02 1.13 
% of capital financed from rev 71.8% 95.1% 100.0% 
Borrowing from NLF 0.105 0.024 0 
 
 
Asset life in years              50 
                        Interest rate  8% 
Inflation rate 5% 6% 7% 
CCRCV charge 3.04 3.04 3.04 
Historic cost charge 1.38 1.23 1.1 
Rebated charge 1.66 1.81 1.194 
% of capital financed from rev 100% 100% 100% 
Borrowing from NLF 0 0 0 
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each year.  This raises the question: why not move to the 
even simpler, and ultimately cheaper, system, where all 
capital expenditure is funded direct from revenue. In real 
life, however, while our assumption of constant real 
investment is likely to be reasonable as an average, the 
actual path of investment is likely to wobble around this 
average from year to year. The advantage of the rebated 
CCRCV approach is that it will smooth the impact of such 
wobbles on customer charges.  
 
4.  Dynamics of system in transitional phase 
4.1  The preceding section looked at the limiting behaviour 
of the rebated system, under the assumption of steady 
state real investment. It would, however, take n years after 
the introduction of the rebate to reach this steady state, 
where n is the asset life. It is a question of great practical 
importance, therefore, to consider how charges would 
move in the early years following the introduction of the 
rebate system. 
 
4.2  In this section we look at the dynamics of the transition 
from unmodified CCRCV pricing to rebated charging. It is 
assumed that, initially, traditional CCRCV charging is being 
operated: we assume that the system is operating in the 
limiting steady state, with unit real investment per annum: 
we assume that, initially, all gross investment is funded by 
borrowing from the NLF, with the CCRCV surplus over 
historic cost loan charges being removed from the system. 
Suppose that, at a given point in time, the rebated charging 
system is introduced. As before, we consider the three 
parameter model specified by asset life, interest rate, and 
inflation rate. 
 
4.3  Chart 1 illustrates the resulting path of rebated 
charges, in the specific case of asset life 30 years, interest 
rate 5%, and inflation 3%.The following table shows the 
rebated charge as a percentage of the CCRCV charge, for 
each of the first 15 years after the introduction of the rebate 
system, for a number of different combinations of asset life, 
interest rate and inflation:- 
 
What the Chart and Table 3 demonstrate is a pattern of a 
fairly rapid initial decline in the rebated charge, which then 
tapers off as the limiting value is approached after n years. 
Of the cases considered in the above table, the slowest 
rate of decline occurs in the left hand column, 
corresponding to asset life of 10 years, interest rate 5%, 
and inflation rate 3%. Even in this case, however, the 
rebated charges initially decline at a rate of 2% relative to 
CCRCV charges. In the other cases considered, (with 
longer asset lives which would be more typical of the water 
industry), the initial rate of decline lies between 2.5% and 
almost 5%. The implication is that substantial customer 
benefits are likely to accrue from a rebated charging 
system immediately from its date of introduction. 
 
4.4  Finally, a note of caution is appropriate. If a rebated 
charging system were being introduced in real life, then the 
starting point would not be CCRCV charging operating in a 
steady state. For example, in the water industry in 
Scotland, while future real investment appears likely to be 
fairly steady on average, (witness the quotation in 
paragraph 3.1 above), past investment experienced a 
significant real uplift to around its present level, round 
about year 2000. This implies that the starting point, if 
rebated CCRCV charging were introduced now, would be 
different from the steady state CCRCV taken as the 
starting point in the above illustrations. To understand the 
actual dynamics of rebated CCRCV charging, introduced 
from the current starting point, would therefore require 
further modelling, which lies beyond our present scope. It is 
clear, however, even without detailed modelling, that a 
rebate system would produce rapid reductions in customer 
charges, relative to the profile of unrebated CCRCV 
charges. 
 
5.  Implications for the Treasury’s capital 
charge 
5.1  In a 1995 White Paper, the then government at 
Westminster set out proposals for a new system of 
government accounting, called Resource Accounting and 
Budgeting, (RAB). RAB is a method of taking into account 
the full cost of assets consumed in the delivery of a 
government service. Essentially, in preparing their budgets, 
government departments count against their Departmental 
Expenditure Limit the cash costs of providing services, 
together with what are known as “non-cash” costs. These 
non-cash costs include an annual capital charge, related to 
the value of the capital assets controlled by the 
department. The capital charge is calculated as a rate of 
interest times the residual value, (having taken off 
depreciation), of the capital stock measured at today’s 
prices. Between 1997 and 2003 the rate of interest used by 
the government for the capital charge was 6% in real 
terms: this became 3.5% in real terms in 2003. 
 
Since Scottish Water is a public corporation, the Scottish 
government has to account each year for a capital charge 
based on the value of Scottish Water’s capital assets. 
 
5.2  The following quotation, from a Treasury document, 
describes the exact basis on which the capital charge is 
calculated: 
 
“The cost of capital charge is 3.5 per cent of the 
net assets (fixed capital and financial assets, net 
of financial liabilities and provisions) employed by 
each department.” (Treasury, 2007) 
 
This quotation clearly states that the capital charge should 
be calculated on the basis of the current cost value of the 
capital assets employed, net of any financial liabilities. The 
introduction of a rebate scheme, as proposed here, would 
mean that Scottish Water, in addition to conventional NLF 
debt, would have a notional financial liability, equivalent to 
the notional historic cost debt on which the customer base 
earns its rebate. In the spirit of the above quotation, 
therefore, the capital charge on the Scottish Government 
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Chart 1:  Real CCRCV charges historic cost charges and rebated charges:  asset life 30 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Rebated charge as % CCRCV charge, by years since introduction of rebate 
 
Asset Life 10 30 50 
 
Nominal Interest rate 
 
5% 
 
8% 
 
5% 
 
8% 
 
5% 
 
8% 
Inflation rate 3% 5% 3% 5% 3% 5% 
 
Year                                                          1           
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
2 98.0 96.4 97.5 95.4 97.2 96.9 
3 96.1 93.1 95.2 91.2 94.4 93.9 
4 94.3 90.1 92.9 87.2 91.8 91.2 
5 92.6 87.4 90.8 83.6 89.3 88.6 
6 91.1 85.0 88.8 80.2 87.0 86.2 
7 89.6 82.8 86.8 77.0 84.7 83.9 
8 88.3 80.8 85.0 74.1 82.5 81.8 
9 87.0 79.0 83.3 71.4 80.4 79.8 
10 85.8 77.5 81.6 68.9 78.4 78.0 
11 84.8 76.1 80.1 66.6 76.5 76.3 
12 84.8 76.1 78.6 64.4 74.7 74.6 
13 84.8 76.1 77.2 62.4 73.0 73.1 
14 84.8 76.1 75.9 60.6 71.4 71.7 
15 84.8 76.1 74.6 58.9 69.8 70.4 
Limit 84.8 76.1 62.3 45.3 44.6 54.6 
 
 
 
 
Interest Rate 5%, Inflation Rate 3%. 
(Gross Investment = 1 per annum) 
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0.20 
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for the assets of Scottish Water should be calculated on 
the basis of net assets reduced by this liability: so the 
rebated system should result in a significant reduction in 
the capital charge on the Scottish Government. 
 
5.3   In fact, we would go further than this: a strong case 
could be made that that portion of the capital stock which 
has been funded from customer charges had never 
represented a burden on public expenditure resources, and 
should therefore be exempt from the capital charge: that is, 
the entire portion of CCRCV which was financed from 
revenue should be exempt from the capital charge. As the 
relevant figures in Table 2 above indicate, the percentages 
of capital financed from revenue are typically high: so the 
savings to the Scottish Government from this would be 
very significant. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
6.1  To recapitulate, the modification to CCRCV pricing 
proposed in this paper has the following advantages: 
 
It would lead to a rapid decrease in water charges, relative 
to charges under unmodified CCRCV pricing: this would be 
of direct benefit to consumers, and bestow a significant 
comparative advantage on industry in Scotland, relative to, 
for example, England, (where unmodified CCRCV remains 
in operation.) 
 
The proposed approach is fully sustainable, both in the 
sense that all sources of finance are appropriately 
rewarded, and also in the sense that the residual public 
expenditure requirement is well within the level of real 
borrowing provision for water currently in the Scottish 
budget. 
 
It should significantly reduce the burden on the Scottish 
Budget of the Treasury’s capital charge for water. 
It prevents the build-up of a financial surplus within Scottish 
Water. In addition, it will be very clear to consumers in 
general exactly what proportion of the capital stock has 
been funded directly by consumers, so increasing the 
feeling that consumers own, and benefit from, a stake in 
the industry. Both of these factors should reduce the 
likelihood of eventual privatisation. 
 
The proposal is entirely consistent with the World Bank 
principles of how customer funded capital might be 
rewarded: and it retains the smoothing benefits of the 
CCRCV approach. 
 
6.2  In the light of the above, we suggest that the proposal 
should be given active consideration by the Scottish 
Government. 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
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Annex 1: Derivation of relationships in Table 1 
 
Recall that PAYS =  (cc -  hc). 
First of all, suppose   < 1: 
If hc > 1, then (cc -  hc) = (cc – hc) + (1 -  )hc > (cc – hc) + (1 -  ) = 1. 
If hc = 1, then (cc -  hc) = (cc – ) = hc = 1. 
If  hc < 1, then (cc -  hc) = (cc – hc) + (1 -  )hc < (cc – hc) + (1 -  ) = 1. 
Moreover,  (cc -  hc) > hc  
if and only if  (cc – hc) > (cc – hc)hc 
if and only if  1 > hc,       (since (cc – hc) > 0). 
Secondly, if    = 1, then  
 (cc -  hc) = cc – hc    1. 
 
 
Annex 2:  Formulae used 
The specific values quoted in the paper were calculated using the following formulae. The model assumes that there 
is a steady state real level of gross investment of 1 unit per annum. There are three input parameters: interest rate, i, 
inflation rate, r, and length of asset life. The model assumes that, up to year n, pure CCRCV pricing has been in 
operation, with the CCRCV surplus, (that is, the excess of CCRCV charges over historic cost interest and 
depreciation), removed from the system. From year (n+1), the surplus is used to fund investment, and regarded as a 
notional loan from customers, on which they will then get a rebate, equal to the historic cost depreciation and interest 
charges on this loan. The model then models the transition to the new steady state. The formulae used are as 
follows: (note that in these formulae, r and i   are expressed as fractions). Note that the values calculated are in 
nominal terms, whereas those given in the text have been deflated to be in real terms:- 
 
Gross investment in year t = 
tr)1(   
Current cost depreciation in year t = tCCD  = 
tr)1(   
Current cost asset value in year t = tCCRCV  = 
trn )1)(1(5.0   
Current cost interest in year t = 
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Self financed investment in year t  =  tSFI   
= 0, for nt  , 
= min( ( tCCD + tCCI - tHCD  - tHCI ), 
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Depreciation element of rebate in year t = tRD  = 


n
k
ktSFI
n 1
1
 
 
Interest element of rebate in year t = tRI  = 
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Net borrowing from NLF in year t  =  
tr)1(   - tSFI  - tHCD  + tRD  
